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ABSTRACT
This study aimed to investigate the relations among insider ownership, board composition, and
firm performance in U.S. restaurant firms. The authors divided insider ownership into three
categories: the equity ownership held per insider owners, the equity ownership held by non-
executive (outside) directors, and the equity ownership shared by executive officers. Board
composition was represented by board independence, board size, and chief executive officer
duality. For data analysis, the authors conducted 319 observations from 31 firms. The authors
found that 3 categories of insider ownership and board composition variables differently influence
short-term operational profitability and long-term value. Managerial ownership negatively influ-
ences short-term profitability, whereas long-term value is affected not only by managerial own-
ership but also by a balanced dispersion of shares to each owner. Dual chief executive officers do
not affect short-term profitability but negatively influence long-term value. The study findings
provide more comprehensive understanding of the effect of the corporate governance system on
firm performance in the restaurant industry.
Introduction
The effect of the corporate governance mechanism
on a firm’s strategic choices and performance has
been widely discussed in the mainstream of
finance and strategic management literature since
the 1970s (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Kesner &
Dalton, 1985). However, the characteristics of the
hospitality industry, such as higher levels of agency
problems (Oak & Iyengar, 2009) and high sensi-
tivity to changes in environments (Guillet &
Mattila, 2010), demand a more effective corporate
governance system, leading to increased attention
to corporate governance in the hospitality industry
(e.g., Altin, Kizildag, & Ozdemir, 2016; Chen, Hou,
& Lee, 2012; Kwansa, Song, Sharma, & Gong,
2014). In particular, ownership structure is a core
component of corporate governance mechanisms
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Providing a firm’s
stake to its executive officers and directors has
been one of the solutions to mitigate a conflict of
interest between ownership and management con-
trol (Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 1999).
Previous studies have discussed insider ownership
in terms of shares held by directors and executive
officers as a whole (Chen et al., 2012). Although
treating insider ownership as a whole has provided
insights by capturing the behavior of all decision
makers (Oswald & Jahera, 1991), it is based on the
assumption that all inside shareholders have com-
mon interests and goals (Demsets & Villalogna,
2001). A board consists of directors from inside and
outside the firm (Ellstrand, Tihanyi, & Johnson,
2002). Outside directors with equity ownership are
more likely to be strict in monitoring top manage-
ment (Beatty & Zajac, 1994), whereas inside directors
may conduct weaker monitoring functions and sup-
port chief executive officers (CEOs) for the sake of
their own career (Ellstrand et al., 2002). Therefore, it
is critical to recognize that each stakeholder in a
single broader category may have different interests
and stakes (Gu & Kim, 2001).
Board composition is a critical determinant of
corporate governance effectiveness (Mizruchi,
1983). Previous studies often did not account for
CONTACT Yeasun Chung y.chung@okstate.edu School of Hotel and Restaurant Administration, Oklahoma State University, 365 Human
Sciences, Stillwater, OK 74078, USA.
THE JOURNAL OF HOSPITALITY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
2017, VOL. 25, NO. 1, 4–16
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10913211.2017.1313604
© 2017 International Association of Hospitality Financial Management Education
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 M
as
sa
ch
us
ett
s, 
Am
he
rst
] a
t 1
5:0
1 2
9 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
interdependence of control mechanisms in the
governance (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996). While
previous studies mostly addressed ownership
structure (Chen et al., 2012; Gu & Kim, 2001; Gu
& Qian, 1999; Park & Jang, 2011), the effect of the
board of directors started gaining attention of
researchers in the hospitality industry (Moon &
Sharma, 2014). However, examining the effect of
the single control mechanism on a firm perfor-
mance or strategic choice may lead to misunder-
standing of the role of corporate governance
(Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996). Only a couple of
variables regarding board composition, such as
board size, gender of board members (Yeh &
Trejos, 2015), CEO duality (Guillet, Seo,
Kucukusta, & Lee, 2013; Yeh, 2013), and board
independence, (Ozdemir & Upneja, 2012) have
been examined separately or along with ownership
structure. Therefore, considering multiple control
mechanisms simultaneously helps to provide a
more comprehensive understanding of corporate
governance.
This study investigated the relation between
insider ownership, board composition, and firm
performance with U.S. restaurant firms. In this
study, insider ownership was investigated by
dividing it into three categories: equity owner-
ship held per insider owner, equity ownership
shared by nonexecutive (outside) directors, and
equity ownership shared by executive officers.
Board composition was represented by board
independence, board size, and CEO duality.
Firm performance was investigated with the
return on asset (ROA) and Tobin’s Q as indica-
tors of short-term profitability and long-term
value, respectively.
Literature review
Insider ownership and firm performance
Ownership structure has two dimensions to con-
sider: the degree of ownership concentration and
the nature of the owners (Iannotta, Nocera, &
Sironi, 2007). Firms may differ from each other
depending not only on whether their ownership
is more dispersed but also on whether one entity
holds more significant shares than others do,
given that the firms have the same degree of
equity ownership concentration (Iannotta et al.,
2007). However, previous studies have over-
looked the nature of owners among insiders
given that they have investigated the effect of
the degree of ownership concentration on perfor-
mance by taking the percentage of shares held by
directors and managers as a whole (Agrawal &
Knoeber, 1996; Chen et al., 2012; Park & Jang,
2010).
There are two opposite arguments to view the
effect of inside ownership and firm performance—
the convergence-of-interest hypothesis and the
entrenchment hypothesis (Jensen & Meckling,
1976). The former hypothesis posits that when
executive officers have larger stock holdings, they
tend to pursue the same goals with shareholders
that ultimately lead to better firm performance (Gu
& Kim, 2001). Alternatively, the entrenchment
hypothesis argues that the higher level of insider
ownership may hinder a firm’s better performance
because it prevents inside shareholders from effec-
tive control of management given that they use
their voting right for their own interests (Morck,
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988).
Previous studies have demonstrated inconclu-
sive findings in the hospitality field. Some studies
have found the positive effect of insider ownership
concentration on firm performance (Gu & Kim,
2001), whereas others have found a curvilinear
relationship (Chen et al., 2012; Park & Jang,
2010). The curvilinear relationship implies the
coexistence of convergence-of-interest hypothesis
and entrenchment hypothesis. Firm performance
increases as the degree of insider ownership
increases at a certain point, and after that, the
firm performance decreases even though the
degree of insider ownership increases.
Furthermore, Chen and colleagues (2012) investi-
gated insider ownership by dividing it into man-
agers’ shareholding and director’s shareholding.
They found that manager’s shareholdings had no
significant effect on hotel firm performance,
whereas insiders’ (as a group) and directors’ share-
holdings were significantly related to firm
performance.
The effect of ownership structure on firm per-
formance is often explained in relation to a firm’s
risk-taking behavior (e.g., Bethel & Liebeskind,
1993; Wright, Ferris, Sarin, & Awasthi, 1996).
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Shareholders prefer high-risk high-return strate-
gies, such as innovation or research and develop-
ment; however, those strategies are less attractive
to managers who want to avoid consequences of
failure (Hill & Snell, 1988). Managers are utility
maximizers who tend to work on their own power,
security, and personal wealth (Hill & Snell, 1988).
Similarly, inside directors are more likely to be in
favor of less risk-taking strategies to secure their
jobs, enhance their rewards, and support their
CEOs because of close ties with the CEOs
(Ellstrand et al., 2002).
Outside directors who hold the equity of a firm
are expected to be more active in their monitoring
roles, ultimately leading to better firm perfor-
mance (Morck et al., 1988). Agency theory
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and resource depen-
dence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) support
the positive effect of outside directors on firm
performance as a result of the effective control of
management and diverse resources from an exter-
nal environment brought in by outside directors
(Peng, 2004). Therefore, we established the follow-
ing hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: A firm’s short-term profitability
increases as the percentage of equity ownership
held by each owner increases.
Hypothesis 1b: A firm’s long-term value increases as
the percentage of equity ownership held by each
owner increases.
Hypothesis 2a: A firm’s short-term profitability
increases as the percentage of equity ownership
held by outside directors increases.
Hypothesis 2b: A firm’s long-term value increases as
the percentage of equity ownership held by outside
directors increases.
Hypothesis 3a: A firm’s short-term profitability
decreases as the percentage of equity ownership
held by executive officers increases.
Hypothesis 3b: A firm’s long-term value decreases as
the percentage of equity ownership held by execu-
tive officers increases.
Board composition and firm performance
A firm can enhance its efficiency in monitoring top
management by designing the board composition
(Beatty & Zajac, 1994). The effects of a board of
directors on performance are supported by agency
theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and resource
dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The
agency theory emphasizes the responsibilities of the
board of directors in monitoring management. An
increased effectiveness in the monitoring of manage-
ment leads to reduced agency cost, which ultimately
results in better firm performance (Hillman &
Dalziel, 2003). In addition, the resource dependence
theory focuses on resources that a board brings to a
firm. A board of directors plays a significant role in
resource provision, including their own experience,
expertise, and reputation, and in networks with
other firms (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).
Previous studies discussed the characteristics of
board composition including age, directorship,
and board independence (Ozdemire & Upneja,
2012); gender and board size (Yeh & Trejos,
2015); and CEO duality (Yermack, 1996, Guillet
et al., 2013). The present study investigated the
effects of board characteristics on firm perfor-
mance by using board size, board independence,
and CEO duality.
Board size
Board size is the number of directors on the board
(Yeh & Trejos, 2015). The board size significantly
affects a board’s decision-making capabilities and
efficiency. The resource dependency theory (Pfeffer
& Salancik, 1978) argues that a larger board pro-
vides more links to the external environment,
brings more resources in dealing with the dynamic
environment, and results in the better performance
of a firm. In addition, a larger board can facilitate
the full range of board roles including inside direc-
tors, affiliated directors, and outside directors
(Dalton, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999).
In contrast, some studies show that a larger
board may hinder the effectiveness of executing
its duty in monitoring and controlling the CEO
and executive officers (Dalton et al., 1999) because
of the difficulties in coordinating different opi-
nions (Cahan, Chua, & Nyamori, 2005; Lipton &
Lorsch, 1992). A few researchers have suggested an
optimal number of board size. Lipton and Lorsch
(1992) recommended having fewer than 10,
whereas Jensen (1993) proposed that fewer than
7 or 8 works best.
6 J. IM AND Y. CHUNG
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 M
as
sa
ch
us
ett
s, 
Am
he
rst
] a
t 1
5:0
1 2
9 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
Previous studies found the negative association
between board size and firm performance
(Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998; Yermack,
1996). Yermack (1996) found that board size is
negatively associated with market evaluation, return
on assets (ROA), and return on sales (ROS). Yeh
and Trejos (2013) also found the negative influence
of board size on the firm performance in the tour-
ism context. The authors provided an alternative
explanation on the basis of the social loafing theory.
The theory posits that a smaller board enhances a
firm’s performance because it increases efficiency in
timely decision making and communication among
board members.
Board independence
The proportion of outside directors on the board is
a critical issue in board composition (Barnhart &
Rosenstein, 1998). A large number of outside direc-
tors enables the board to be more independent and
provide a higher level of corporate governance to
shareholders by integrating and coordinating the
internal and external interests of various share-
holders (Ellstrand et al., 2002; Johnson, Hoskisson,
& Hitt, 1993). As suggested in the resource depen-
dency theory, diverse backgrounds of board mem-
bers bring better resources and knowledge in
interacting with an external environment to a firm
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In contrast, there is
criticism about the role of outside directors.
Outside directors may not be valuable in decision
making that generally requires an in-depth under-
standing of a firm given that they may lack time,
access to information, and company-specific knowl-
edge beyond financial performance (Baysinger &
Hoskisson, 1990; Hart, 1995). However, previous
studies have supported the positive effect of board
independence on firm performance and a firm’s
restructuring decision (Johnson et al., 1993; Luan
& Tang, 2007; Yeh, 2013).
CEO duality
CEO duality is another important component of
the corporate governance mechanism as a board
leadership structure (Baliga, Moyer, & Rao, 1996;
Elsayed, 2007). It indicates that a CEO plays the
role of the chairman of the board (Rechner &
Dalton, 1991). Agency theory, stewardship theory,
and resource dependence theory provide conflicting
views on the relation between CEO duality and firm
performance (Elsayed, 2007; Guillet et al., 2013;
Krause, Semadeni, & Cannella, 2014). Agency the-
ory posits that a nondual CEO can enhance the
monitoring effectiveness of the board of directors
by separating the power between the CEO and the
chairman of the board (Elsayed, 2007). Along with
agency theory, resource dependence theory also
emphasizes the advantages of different resources
brought by the chairman of the board from the
outside (Boyd, 1995)
In contrast, stewardship theory argues that a
CEO tends to pursue the same goal the share-
holders have by being “a good steward” of a firm
(Donaldson & Davis, 1991, p. 51). Dual CEOs can
provide the unitary and effective leadership of the
company, build credibility in management, mitigate
the asymmetry of information between top man-
agers and the board of directors, and reduce the
costs of firms including agency cost and informa-
tion cost (Baliga et al., 1996; Finkelstein & D’Aveni,
1994). A nondual CEO may generate the rivalry
between the chairman of the board and the CEO
given that having two spokesmen may cause con-
fusion in communication with various stakeholders
from outside the firm and hinder a firm’s innova-
tion or new strategy initiated by the CEO if the
board does not trust the CEO (Baliga et al., 1996).
Previous studies have shown inconsistent results
regarding the influence of the dual CEOs on firm
performance. Some studies have found positive
effect of dual CEOs on performance (Rechner &
Dalton, 1991), whereas others have found a non-
significant relation (Baliga et al., 1996). Elsayed
(2007) emphasized that the effect of dual CEOs
on firm performance varies across the industry
context and in corporate performance itself.
In the hospitality industry, the positive effect of
dual CEOs on firm performance was observed in
previous studies (Guillet et al., 2013; Yeh, 2013). In
Guillet and colleagues’ (2013) study, dual CEOs
have a positive effect on a firm’s performance,
which was measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q. The
authors discussed that the role of dual CEOs is
more significant in the restaurant industry where
management teams face a high degree of short-
term decisions suggested by Reich (1993). On the
basis of the aforementioned discussion, the follow-
ing hypotheses were established.
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Hypothesis 4a: The smaller the board, the better a
firm performs in short-term profitability.
Hypothesis 4b: The smaller the board, the better a
firm performs in long-term value.
Hypothesis 5a: The higher degree of board indepen-
dence, the better a firm performs in short-term
profitability.
Hypothesis 5b: The higher degree of board indepen-
dence, the better a firm performs in long-term value.
Hypothesis 6a: Having dual CEOs has a positive
effect on short-term profitability.
Hypothesis 6b: Having dual CEOs has a positive
effect on long-term value.
Method
Data
To test the proposed hypotheses, we chose the U.S.
restaurant industry. The restaurant industry is
appropriate to test the role of corporate governance
on firm performance because of its high ratio of
short-term decision to long-term decision (Reich,
1994) and sensitivity to economic conditions
(Guillet et al., 2013) that requires to having an
effective corporate governance system in decision
making to respond to challenges in the market.
Thus, this study selected publicly traded restau-
rant firms in the United States as a sample. We
identified the lists of firms using the standard indus-
trial classification (SIC) code (“eating places” = 5812)
and the North American industry classification sys-
tem code (NAICS, “full service” = 722110; “limited
service” = 722211). We retrieved the data related to
insider ownership and board characteristics from the
forms of definitive proxy statement (DEA 14F), and
we collected financial data from a firm’s annual
reports (10-K) for the period of 1998–2013. We
chose the 1998–2013 period for this study for two
reasons. First, there are few available observations to
validate the results of regression analysis because of
the insufficient number of publicly traded restaurant
firms. Second, some of the restaurants’ ownership
related data were not available before 1998.
Therefore, this study collected data for the time
period of 1998–2013.
We obtained monthly stock prices ined from
Yahoo Finance. We calculated annual stock prices
using a mean of monthly prices for each year.
After we eliminated missing values related to
stock prices and 17 outliers, we had 319 observa-
tions from 31 firms for final data analysis includ-
ing 202 observations from 20 full-service
restaurant firms and 117 observations from 11
limited-service restaurant firms.
Measurement
Dependent variables
We used two dependent variables to measure a
firm’s performance: ROA and Tobin’s Q. We used
ROA as an indicator for a firm’s short-term opera-
tional profitability, indicating a firm’s efficiency in
generating profits with its asset during a specific
year (Kang, Lee, & Huh, 2010). Therefore, we cal-
culated it by dividing the net income by the asset
(Chen et al., 2012). We used Tobin’s Q for an
indicator of long-term value potential because it
reflects the expected future value (Guillet et al.,
2013; Lee & Park, 2009). We estimated the approxi-
mated Q as the sum of market value of common
equity, market value of preferred stock, and book
value of the total liabilities divided by the book
value of total asset (Park & Jang, 2010).
Independent variables
In this study, we used six independent variables,
three of which are related to insider ownership: the
percentage of insider ownership held per owner
(IPO), the percentage of insider ownership held by
nonexecutive directors (PO), and the percentage of
insider ownership held by executive officers (PE).
We calculated IPO by dividing the percentage of
insider ownership by the number of insiders in a
group (Warfield, Wild, & Wild, 1995). We esti-
mated PO as the percentage of equity sharehold-
ings held by nonexecutive directors (Agrawal &
Knoeber, 1996). Last, we assessed PE with the
percentage of equity shareholdings held by execu-
tive officers (Mehran, 1995).
The other three of the six independent variables
involved board characteristics: board size (BS),
board independence (BI), and CEO duality (CEO
DUAL). We measured BS as the number of board
members (Yermack, 1996). We estimated BI as the
percentage of nonexecutive directors among the
entire number of board numbers (Ozdemir &
8 J. IM AND Y. CHUNG
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Upneja, 2012). Last, we used a binary variable for
CEO DUAL: dual CEO = 1 and nondual CEO = 0
(Rechner & Dalton, 1991).
Along with the independent variables, the study
also used three control variables: leverage (LEV),
firm size (FS), and market condition (MC). We
calculated LEV by dividing liabilities by asset
(Guillet & Mattila, 2010). We estimated FS by the
total asset of a firm (Tsai & Gu, 2007). Last, we
entered MC into the regression model to control
for general market condition for a specific year
(Kang et al., 2010). We calculated it by market
return minus risk free rate. We used S&P 500
stock prices to calculate the market return and
10-year treasury rate q was used for the risk-free
rate (Kang et al., 2010). For all variables, we
applied a fixed-effect transformation to eliminate
a firm-constant unobserved effect.
Model
We conducted firm-fixed, panel-data, and hierarch-
ical regression analysis to examine the hypotheses.
The regression models were established as follows.
ROAt ¼ αþ FSβ1t þ LEVβ2t þMCβ3t
þ IPOβ4t þ POβ5t þ PEβ6t
þ BSβ7t þ BIβ8t þ CEO DUALβ9t
Tobin0s Qt ¼ αþ FSβ1t þ LEVβ2t þMCβ3t
þ IPOβ4t þ POβ5t þ PEβ6t
þ BSβ7t þ BIβ8t þ CEO DUALβ9t
where ROA = return on asset, Tobin’s Q = approx-
imation of Tobin’s Q, IPO = percentage of insider
equity ownership shared by entire insider group
per owner, PO = percentage of equity ownership
shared by nonexecutive directors, PE = percentage
of equity ownership shared by executive officers,
BS = board size, BI = board independence, CEO
DUAL = CEO duality, FS = firm size, LEV =
leverage, and MC = market condition.
Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the
sampled restaurant firms. We performed descriptive
statistics with the values, which has the fix-effect
reflected. The mean Q was 0.0282, with a range
from –2.925 to 4.1332. The mean ROA was 0.0003,
with a range from –0.221 to 0.340. Themean IPOwas
–0.0005, with a range from –0.030 to 0.038. Themean
POwas –0.0157, with a range from –0.5341 to 0.7228.
Themean PEwas 0.0001, with a range from –1.943 to
3.157. The mean BS was –0.0193, with a range from –
3.066 to 2.333. The maximum and minimum of BI
were –0.2083 and 0.1949, respectively. For the results
of frequency analysis with CEODUAL, 188 firms had
dual CEOs, whereas 131 firms did not. The control
variable LEV’s mean was 0.0119, with a range from –
1.203 to 0.759. The mean FS was –35,370, with a
range from –2,162,250 to 2,262,569. The mean MC
was –0.0008, with a range from –0.4353 and 0.2574.
As Table 2 shows, PO showed significant but
negative correlation with Q (r = –.188) whereas BI
positively correlated with Q (r = .125). In addition,
PE negatively correlated with ROA (r = –.127). For
control variables, LEV (r = –.293) had a negative
correlation with ROA, whereas MC (r = .121) had
a positive correlation with ROA. However, none of
the control variables was significantly correlated
with Q. Multicollinearity was checked with the
Table 1. Summary of Descriptive Statistics (N = 319).
Variable M SD Minimum Maximum
Approximated Tobin’s Q 0.0282 0.7541 –2.925 4.1332
Return on investment 0.0003 0.0564 –0.2219 0.3400
Inside equity ownership per owner –0.0005 0.0076 –0.0300 0.0389
Percentage of equity ownership held by nonexecutive (outside) directors –0.0157 0.1123 –0.5341 0.7228
Percentage of equity ownership held by managers (including executive directors) 0.0001 0.0556 –0.1943 0.3157
Board size –0.0193 0.8979 –3.066 2.333
Board independence –0.00007 0.0628 –0.2083 0.1949
Leverage 0.0119 0.2060 –1.2038 0.7596
Firm size –35,370 488,712 –2,162,250 2,262,569
Market condition –0.0008 0.1829 –0.4353 0.2574
Chief executive officer duality 188 (dual chief executive officer) 131 (nondual)
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values of variance inflation factor, and tolerance
and was not an issue in the data because the values
of the variance inflation factor and tolerance were
less than 5 and greater than 0.10, respectively.
Main analysis
To test the first model, we conducted a three-stage
hierarchical regression analysis with ROA as a
dependent variable (see Table 3). In Step 1 of the
model, we entered all three control variables. The
model was statistically significant, F(3, 315) =
11.125, p < .001, and explained 8.7% of variance
in ROA (adjusted R2 = .087). LEV (t = –5.258, p <
.001, β = –.284) and MC (t = 1.819, p < .1, β =
.098) were significant predictors of ROA, whereas
FS (t = –0.202, p = .840, β = –.011) was not.
In Step 2, we added three independent vari-
ables related to insider ownership. The model
revealed statistically significant, F(6, 312) =
7.542, p < .001, and resulted in an increase of
3.1% in explained variance (ΔR2 = 0.031). LEV (t
= –6.699, p< .01, β = –.313) and PE (t = –1.997, p
< .05, β = –.128) were significantly related to
ROA, whereas MC (t = 1.628, p = .104, β =
.087), firm size (t = –0.178, p = .858, β =
–.010), IPO (t = –.663, p = .508, β = –.055), and
PO (t = –0.905, p = .366, β = –.073) were not.
Table 2. Summary of Pearson’s Correlations (N = 319).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Inside equity ownership per owner — .643** .323** –.120* –.051 .011 –.129* –.028 –.064 –.070 –.108
2. Percentage of equity ownership held by
nonexecutive (outside) directors
— –.140* .081 .116* –.113* –.218** –.034 .001 –.188** –.022
3. Percentage of equity ownership held by
managers (including executive directors)
— –.209** –.315** .212** –.039 .020 –.042 –.085 –.127*
4. Board size — .257** –.118* .139* .181* .021 .023 .085
5. Board independence — –.005 .120* .247** –.001 .125* –.035
6. Chief executive officer duality — –.073 –.018 –.024 –.085 .035
7. Leverage — .120* –.078 .084 –.293**
8. Firm size — –.059 .102 –.051
9. Market condition — –.005 .121*
10. Approximated Tobin’s Q — .050
11. Return on investment —
Table 3. Results of the Hierarchical Regression, With Return on Investment as the Dependent Variable (N = 319).
B SE B β t F Adjusted R2 Δ R2
Model 1 Constant 0.001 0.003 0.397 11.125*** .087 —
LEV –0.082 0.016 –.284 –5.258***
FS 0 0.000 –.011 –0.202
MC 0.032 0.018 .098 1.819*
Model 2 Constant 0.001 0.003 0.177 7.542*** .110 .031**
LEV –0.091 0.016 –.313 –5.699***
FS 0 0.000 –.010 –0.178
MC 0.028 0.017 .087 1.628
IPO –0.426 0.643 –.055 –0.663
PO –0.039 0.043 –.073 –0.095
PE –0.137 0.069 –.128 –1.997**
Model 3 Constant –0.003 0.005 –0.555 5.720*** .118 .016
LEV –0.093 0.016 –.321 –5.755***
FS 0 0.000 –.015 –0.276
MC 0.028 0.017 .086 1.611
IPO –0.211 0.647 –.027 –0.327
PO –0.049 0.043 –.092 –1.132
PE –0.153 0.072 –.143 –2.121**
BS 0.008 0.004 .126 2.219**
BI –0.057 0.056 –.060 –1.016
CEO 0.006 0.007 .048 0.882
Note. BS = board size, BI = board independence, CEO = CEO duality, FS = firm size, IPO = insider equity ownership per owner, LEV = leverage, MC =
market condition, PE = percentage of equity ownership held by managers (including executive directors), PO = percentage of equity ownership
held by nonexecutive (outside) directors, and Q = approximated Tobin’s Q.
*p < 0.1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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Last, we entered in the model the rest of the
independent variables related to board structure.
The final model was statistically significant, F(9,
309) = 5.720, p < .001. However, there was no
significant change in the explained of variance
(ΔR2 = 0.016, p = .123). LEV (t = –.5.755, p <
.001, β = –.321), and PE (t = –2.121, p < .05, β
= –.143) were negatively related to ROA,
whereas BS (t = 2.219, p < .05, β = .126) had a
positive relation to ROA. However, the rest of
the variables, including MC (t = 1.611, p = .108,
β = .086), FS (t = –0.276, p = .783, β = –.015),
IPO (t = –0.327, p = .744, β = –.027), PO (t = –
1.132, p = .259, β = –.092), BI (t = –1.016, p =
.310, β = –.060), and CEO DUAL (t = 0.882, p =
.378, β = .048), were not statistically significant
in the model.
Next, we conducted another three-stage hierarch-
ical regression analysis with Tobin’s Q as a depen-
dent variable (see Table 4). We entered in the model
control variables and independent variables related
to insider ownership and board composition, follow-
ing the same sequence of the first model. In Step 1,
themodel was statistically nonsignificant, F(3, 315) =
1.677, p = .172. However, the model explained only
0.6% of variance in Tobin’s Q (adjusted R2 = .006).
None of the control variables was significantly
related to Tobin’s Q: FS (t = 1.663, p = .097, β =
.094), LEV (t = 1.300, p = .194, β = .073), andMC (t =
0.110, p = .913, β = .006).
In Step 2, after adding three independent variables
related to insider ownership, the model became sta-
tistically significant, F(6, 312) = 4.606, p < .001.
There was a significant change in explained variance,
which is 6.6% (ΔR2 = .066). FS (t = 1.817, p < .1, β =
.099) and IPO (t = 2.812, p < .01, β = .239) were
positively related to Tobin’s Q, whereas PO (t = –
4.416, p < .001, β = –.365) and PE (t = –3.265, p < .01,
β = –.215) were negatively related. LEV (t = 0.283, p
= .777, β = .016) and MC (t = 0.154, p = .877, β =
.008) were not statistically significant.
In Step 3, the model remained statistically signifi-
cant, F(9, 309) = 3.767, p < .001. However, there
was no significant change in explained variance
(ΔR2 = .017). In the final model, IPO, PO, PE, BI,
and CEO DUAL were found to be significant predic-
tors of Tobin’s Q. To be specific, IPO (t = 2.789, p <
.01, β = .239) was positively related to Tobin’s Q,
whereas PO (t = –4.614, p < .001, β = –.386) and PE
(t = –2.352, p < .05, β = –.162) were negatively
correlated with Tobin’s Q. In addition, BI (t = 1.893,
p < .1, β = .115) was positively related to Tobin’s Q,
whereas CEO DUAL (t = –1.713, p < .1, β = –.096)
was negatively correlated. However, FS (t = 1.237, p =
Table 4. Results of the Hierarchical Regression, With Tobin’s Q as the Dependent Variable (N = 319).
B SE B β t F Adjusted R2 Δ R2
Model 1 Constant 0.030 0.042 0.714 1.677 .006 —
LEV 0.269 0.207 .073 1.300
FS 0 0.000 .094 1.663*
MC 0.025 0.231 .006 0.110
Model 2 Constant 0.007 0.041 0.163 4.606*** .064 .066***
LEV 0.058 0.206 .016 0.283
FS 0 0.000 .099 1.817*
MC 0.035 0.225 .008 0.154
IPO 23.435 8.335 .239 2.812***
PO –2.448 0.554 –.365 –4.416***
PE –2.908 0.891 –.215 –3.265***
Model 3 Constant 0.090 0.065 1.394 3.767*** .073 .114
LEV –0.014 0.209 –.004 –.065
FS 0 0.000 .071 1.237
MC 0.022 0.224 .005 0.097
IPO 23.404 8.391 .239 2.789***
PO –2.592 0.562 –.386 –4.614***
PE –2.198 0.935 –.162 –2.352**
BS –0.004 0.049 –.005 –0.078
BI 1.378 0.728 .115 1.893*
CEO –0.147 0.086 –.096 –1.713*
Note. BS = board size, BI = board independence, CEO = CEO duality, FS = firm size, IPO = insider equity ownership per owner, LEV = leverage, MC =
market condition, PE = percentage of equity ownership held by managers (including executive directors), PO = percentage of equity ownership
held by nonexecutive (outside) directors, and Q = approximated Tobin’s Q.
*p < 0.1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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.217, β = .071), LEV (t = –.065, p = .948, β = –.004),
MC (t = .097, p = .923, β = .005), and BS (t = –.078, p =
.938, β = –.005) had no statistically significant relation
with Tobin’s Q.
Ancillary analyses
We conducted additional analyses with 1-year
lagged performance measures because of the endo-
genous relation between corporate governance
variables and performance (Park & Jang, 2010;
Yeh, 2013) and because the effect of decisions
made by current board of directors may later be
reflected in the firm performance. We established
the regression models as follows, and we con-
ducted three-stage hierarchical regressions follow-
ing the same sequence of entering variables with
the previous analysis in the study.
ROAt ¼ αþ FSβ1t1 þ LEVβ2t1 þMCβ3t1
þ IPOβ4t1 þ POβ5t1 þ PEβ6t1
þ BSβ7t1 þ BIβ8t1 þ CEO DUALβ9t1
Tobin0s Qt ¼ αþ FSβ1t1 þ LEVβ2t1
þMCβ3t1 þ IPOβ4t1 þ POβ5t1
þ PEβ6t1 þ BSβ7t1 þ BIβ8t1
þ CEO DUALβ9t1
The results of the analysis indicated the same
directions of the relation between ownership struc-
ture related variables and performance measures
as shown in Tables 5 and 6.
Discussion
We aimed to assess the effect of insider ownership
and board composition on firm performance in
the restaurant industry. We classified insider own-
ership into three categories (inside equity owner-
ship per owner, inside equity ownership held by
outside directors, and that held by executive offi-
cers) to better understand the different stakes and
interests of each stakeholder in the same category.
In addition, we addressed the interdependence of
the corporate governance mechanism by incorpor-
ating board composition variables. We considered
firm performance in terms of short-term profit-
ability and long-term value.
We found that the effect of the corporate gov-
ernance system on firm performance varied upon
the performance measures. The results indicated
that an increase in managerial ownership lowers
short-term profitability, which is inconsistent with
the findings of Chen and colleagues’ (2012) study.
The negative effect can be supported by the
Table 5. Results of the Hierarchical Regression, With 1-Year Lagged ROA as the Dependent Variable (N = 288).
B SE B β t F Adjusted R2 Δ R2
Model 1 Constant 0.003 0.004 0.820 1.096 .001 —
LEV 0.003 0.018 .010 0.163
FS 0 0.000 –.060 –1.010
MC 0.028 0.020 .085 1.434
Model 2 Constant 0.003 0.004 0.853 1.785 .016 .025*
LEV 0 0.018 .000 –0.002
FS 0 0.000 –.059 –0.994
MC 0.022 0.020 .068 1.136
IPO –0.324 0.734 –.041 –0.441
PO 0.018 0.048 .033 0.364
PE –0.167 0.086 –.140 –1.936*
Model 3 Constant 0.009 0.006 1.488 1.764* .023 .017
LEV 0.002 0.018 .005 0.087
FS 0 0.000 –.039 –0.636
MC 0.021 0.020 .064 1.076
IPO –0.285 0.738 –.036 –0.386
PO 0.019 0.049 .036 0.386
PE –0.186 0.091 –.156 –2.044**
BS 0.002 0.005 .027 0.427
BI –0.110 0.064 –.114 –1.714*
CEO –0.009 0.008 –.075 –1.243
Note. BS = board size, BI = board independence, CEO = CEO duality, FS = firm size, IPO = insider equity ownership per owner, LEV = leverage, MC =
market condition, PE = percentage of equity ownership held by managers (including executive directors), PO = percentage of equity ownership
held by nonexecutive (outside) directors, and Q = approximated Tobin’s Q.
*p < 0.1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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entrenchment hypothesis (Jensen & Meckling,
1976), which proposes that a higher degree of
shareholdings held by executive officers hinders
effective external control on top management.
The negative effect of managerial ownership
seems to outweigh its positive effect in restaurant
firms.
The results showed that a larger board positively
affects a firm’s short-term profitability. This is
opposed to the results of previous studies, which
show that a firm with a smaller board performs
better by increasing the efficiency in the commu-
nication and decision-making process, as sug-
gested by the social loafing theory (e.g., Yeh &
Trejos, 2015). The positive effect of board size on
profitability is supported by the resource depen-
dence theory, indicating that a larger board is
capable of bringing in more resources—such as
experience, expertise, and networks—to a firm.
This makes sense in the restaurant industry in
particular, where firms are very vulnerable to
changes in environments and make decisions that
are oriented toward the short term (Reich, 1993).
However, IPO, PO, BI, and CEO DUAL do not
have statistically significant relations with ROA.
IPO and PO may not be large enough to capture
the effect on a firm’s short-term profitability in the
restaurant industry. Among restaurant firms
whose market shares account for 80% of the entire
market in terms of market capitalization, the aver-
age percentage of inside equity ownership as a
whole is less than 10%, which also indicates that
the average percentage of inside equity ownership
per owner ranges between 0.1% and 1%.
Moreover, the average percentage of outside direc-
tors’ shareholding ranges between 0.2% and 15%.
These percentages may indicate that a firm’s deci-
sion making is largely affected by institutional
ownership and other individual block holders.
Therefore, the findings imply that giving stock
options solely may not work well as a solution to
reduce agency cost in the restaurant industry.
Board independence and CEO duality have both
benefits and challenges in the corporate govern-
ance mechanism, and the benefits could be offset
by challenges. For example, an independent board
with many outside directors provides more objec-
tive views on a company’s operational directions,
but the views may be ineffective because of a lack
of understanding of business information within a
short time.
Unlike short-term operational profitability, the
long-term value measured by Tobin’s Q was sig-
nificantly changed by the ownership per inside
Table 6. Results of the Hierarchical Regression, With 1-Year Lagged Tobin’s Q as the Dependent Variable (N = 288).
B SE B β t F Adjusted R2 Δ R2
Model 1 Constant 0.045 0.057 0.798 4.276*** .034 —
LEV –0.390 0.274 –.083 –1.421
FS 0 0.000 .134 2.299**
MC 0.775 0.307 .148 2.524**
Model 2 Constant 0.017 0.056 0.306 5.149*** .080 .055***
LEV –0.672 0.278 –.143 –2.422**
FS 0 0.000 .140 2.455**
MC 0.753 0.302 .143 2.492**
IPO 29.539 11.274 .238 2.620***
PO –2.961 0.740 –.352 –4.004***
PE –3.434 1.325 –.181 –2.92**
Model 3 Constant 0.135 0.090 1.494 3.877*** .083 .012
LEV –0.757 0.284 –.162 –2.669***
FS 0 0.000 .126 2.115**
MC 0.739 0.302 .141 2.450**
IPO 30.830 11.357 .248 2.715***
PO –3.186 0.755 –.379 –4.219***
PE –2.899 1.402 –.153 –2.068**
BS 0.073 0.069 .064 1.052
BI 0.098 0.990 .006 0.099
CEO –0.194 0.117 –.097 0.100
Note. BS = board size, BI = board independence, CEO = CEO duality, FS = firm size, IPO = insider equity ownership per owner, LEV = leverage, MC =
market condition, PE = percentage of equity ownership held by managers (including executive directors), PO = percentage of equity ownership
held by nonexecutive (outside) directors, and Q = approximated Tobin’s Q.
*p < 0.1. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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owner, nonexecutive ownership, managerial own-
ership, board independence, and CEO duality. The
positive relation between IPO and Tobin’s Q
implies that not only is a higher level of insider
equity ownership critical, but so is the balanced
dispersion of shares to each owner to effectively
cause managers and directors to have common
goals and interests with shareholders.
Unlike the nonsignificant relation of BI and CEO
DUAL with short-term profitability, BI had a posi-
tive relation with the long-term value measure. The
result is consistent with that of previous studies
(e.g., Luan & Tang, 2007; Yeh, 2013). This indicates
that outside directors play a significant role in
monitoring and controlling the top management
in the restaurant industry for long-term perfor-
mance as the agency theory claims (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). However, CEO duality has a nega-
tive relation with Q, implying that the costly man-
ifestations of agency problems cannot be mitigated
enough by CEO duality. This is inconsistent with
the results of previous studies (Guillet et al., 2013).
Giving unitary strong leadership to the CEO may
not work well in the restaurant industry because of
the significant agency problem (Oak & Ivengar,
2009) that hinders coalignment of the top manage-
ment’s interests with that of shareholders. In addi-
tion, board size has no significant effect on Q, and
the result is different from those of previous studies
(Yeh & Trejos, 2015). In addition, BS was not
significantly related to Q, as it was with ROA.
The results of ancillary analyses with one-year
lagged firm performance revealed the same direction
of each variable toward ROA and Tobin’s Q with the
results of cross-sectional data although the signifi-
cance levels became different. These results provide a
strong support for the findings of the main analyses
by securing the issues from the endogenous problems
and reflecting the time effect of decisions made by
shareholders and board of directors.
We have provided a more comprehensive under-
standing of the effect of the corporate governance
system on firm performance by embracing the nat-
ure of interdependence of two major corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms. In particular, we found the
significance of breadth of distribution of equity
ownership to investigate the inside ownership con-
centration. We used inside equity ownership held by
per owner as a measure of inside ownership, and the
results revealed that IPO has no significant relation
with ROA but is positively related to Tobin’s Q. The
results also indicate that equally highly dispersed
equity will motivate owners to pursue their goal
matched with shareholder’s wealth.
In addition, the different relations of each board
composition variable with each performancemeasure
imply a unique role of board composition variables
upon different performance measures. A larger board
works in short-term profitability, whereas board
independence and dual CEOs work in long-term
value. On the basis of the results, restaurant firms
may evaluate the effectiveness of their corporate gov-
ernancemechanismswith performancewith different
measures. The results of the study indicate that res-
taurant firms need to consider redesigning a com-
pensation program to improve an effective corporate
system, given that we found that several important
features of the system were not related to firm per-
formance, as suggested bymajor theories discussed in
the study. In contrast, this may indicate the demand
for further studies related to institutional ownership
that accounts for the large portion of equity owner-
ship of restaurant firms.
This study is not free of limitations, and future
research can be carried out beyond those limitations.
The findings should be generalized with caution
given that in this study we used publicly traded res-
taurant firms in the United States. In addition, we
classified insider ownership into two categories in
terms of the nature of owners: outside directors and
executive officers. This classification may overlook
potential conflicts of interest for affiliated directors
who are not full-time but have some personal or
business relationships with a firm (Peng, 2004).
Researchers can consider different classifications
and examine other types of ownership including
individual block holders for future research.
Moreover, there are other possible influencing factors
(e.g., industry and firm characteristics) on the relation
between corporate governance and firm perfor-
mance. For example, the restaurant type (e.g., quick
service and full service) may be an influence because
of the differences in terms of operational complexity
and labor intensity (Guillet et al., 2013). A full-service
restaurant tends to involve amore complex operation
and more intensive labor than does a quick-service
restaurant does because a full-service restaurant
focuses more on differentiation than on
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standardization, whereas a quick service restaurant
standardizes and simplifies each stage of production
for efficiency (Harrington, 2001; Tse & Olsen, 1988).
The restaurant industry heavily relies on franchising
that could help reduce monitoring costs and share
business risks. In the franchising system, changes in
product line, materials, or services require collabora-
tion between a franchisor and franchisees. Moreover,
a strategic plan asking franchisees to invest in would
meet strong resistance from franchisees. As the suc-
cess of implementing a strategy formulated by insi-
ders (i.e., franchisor) often depends on the relation
between franchisor and franchisees. Thus, the pro-
portion of franchised establishments would help bet-
ter understand the corporate governance–firm
performance relation. Last, using different perfor-
mance measures such as cash flow would be mean-
ingful for future studies to provide a more
comprehensive understanding of the effect of corpo-
rate mechanism on firm performance.
Notes on contributors
Dr. Jinyoung Im is an assistant professor in the Division of
Engineering, Business, and Computing at Penn State Berks.
Dr. Yeasun Chung is an assistant professor in the School of
Hotel and Restaurant Administration at Oklahoma State
University.
References
Agrawal, A., & Knoeber, C. R. (1996). Firm performance and
mechanisms to control agency problems between man-
agers and shareholders. Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis, 31(3), 377–397.
Altin, M., Kizildag,M., &Ozdemir, O. (2016). Corporate govern-
ance, ownership structure, and credit ratings of hospitality
firms. The Journal of Hospitality Financial Management, 24
(1), 5–19.
Baliga, B., Moyer, R. C., & Rao, R. S. (1996). CEO duality and
firm performance: What’s the fuss? Strategic Management
Journal, 17(1), 41–53.
Barnhart, S. W., & Rosenstein, S. (1998). Board composition,
managerial ownership, and firm performance: An empiri-
cal analysis. Financial Review, 33(4), 1–16.
Baysinger, B., & Hoskisson, R. E. (1990). The composition of
boards of directors and strategic control: Effects on corpo-
rate strategy. Academy of Management Review, 15(1), 72–87.
Beatty, R. P., & Zajac, E. J. (1994). Managerial incentives,
monitoring, and risk bearing: A study of executive com-
pensation, ownership, and board structure in initial public
offerings. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(2), 313–335.
Bethel, J. E., & Liebeskind, J. (1993). The effects of ownership
structure on corporate restructuring. Strategic
Management Journal, 14(S1), 15–31.
Boyd, B. K. (1995). CEO duality and firm performance: A
contingency model. Strategic Management Journal, 16(4),
301–312.
Cahan, S. F., Chua, F., & Nyamori, R. O. (2005). Board
structure and executive compensation in the public sector:
New Zealand evidence. Financial Accountability &
Management, 21(4), 437–465.
Chen, M. H., Hou, C. L., & Lee, S. (2012). The impact of
insider managerial ownership on corporate performance of
Taiwanese tourist hotels. International Journal of
Hospitality Management, 31(2), 338–349.
Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L., & Ellstrand, A. E.
(1999). Number of directors and financial performance: A
meta-analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 42(6),
674–686.
Demsetz, H., & Villalonga, B. (2001). Ownership structure
and corporate performance. Journal of Corporate Finance,
7(3), 209–233.
Donaldson, L., & Davis, J. H. (1991). Stewardship theory or
agency theory: CEO governance and shareholder returns.
Australian Journal of Management, 16(1), 49–64.
Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., & Wells, M. T. (1998). Larger
board size and decreasing firm value in small firms.
Journal of Financial Economics, 48(1), 35–54.
Ellstrand, A. E., Tihanyi, L., & Johnson, J. L. (2002). Board
structure and international political risk. Academy of
Management Journal, 45(4), 769–777.
Elsayed, K. (2007). Does CEO duality really affect corporate
performance? Corporate Governance: An International
Review, 15(6), 1203–1214.
Finkelstein, S., & D’aveni, R. A. (1994). CEO duality as a
double-edged sword: How boards of directors balance
entrenchment avoidance and unity of command.
Academy of Management Journal, 37(5), 1079–1108.
Gu, Z., & Kim, Y. K. (2001). Managerial stock holdings and
firm performance: Empirical evidence from the restaurant
industry. International Journal of Hospitality and Tourism
Administration, 2(1), 49–65.
Gu, Z. & Qian, Y. (1999). Hotel managerial ownership and
firm performance: An empirical investigation. Tourism &
Hospitality Research, 1(2), 145–154.
Guillet, B.D., &Mattila, A. S. (2010). Adescriptive examination of
corporate governance in the hospitality industry. International
Journal of Hospitality Management, 29(4), 677–684.
Guillet, B. D., Seo, K., Kucukusta, D., & Lee, S. (2013). CEO
duality and firm performance in the US restaurant indus-
try: Moderating role of restaurant type. International
Journal of Hospitality Management, 33, 339–346.
Harrington, R. (2001). Environmental uncertainty within the
hospitality industry: Exploring the measure of dynamism
and complexity between restaurant segments. Journal of
Hospitality & Tourism Research, 25(4), 386–398.
Hart, O. (1995). Corporate governance: some theory and
implications. The Economic Journal, 678–689.
THE JOURNAL OF HOSPITALITY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 15
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 M
as
sa
ch
us
ett
s, 
Am
he
rst
] a
t 1
5:0
1 2
9 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
Hill, C. W., & Snell, S. A. (1988). External control, corporate
strategy, and firm performance in research-intensive
industries. Strategic Management Journal, 9(6), 577–590.
Himmelberg, C. P., Hubbard, R. G., & Palia, D. (1999).
Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership
and the link between ownership and performance. Journal
of Financial Economics, 53(3), 353–384.
Iannotta, G., Nocera, G., & Sironi, A. (2007). Ownership
structure, risk and performance in the European banking
industry. Journal of Banking & Finance, 31(7), 2127–2149.
Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit,
and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of
Finance, 48(3), 831–880.
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm:
Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership struc-
ture. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–360.
Johnson, R. A., Hoskisson, R. E., & Hitt, M. A. (1993). Board
of director involvement in restructuring: The effects of
board versus managerial controls and characteristics.
Strategic Management Journal, 14(S1), 33–50.
Kang, K. H., Lee, S., & Huh, C. (2010). Impacts of positive and
negative corporate social responsibility activities on com-
pany performance in the hospitality industry. International
Journal of Hospitality Management, 29(1), 72–82.
Kesner, I. F., & Dalton, D. R. (1985). The effect of board
composition on CEO succession and organizational per-
formance. Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics,
24(2), 3–20.
Krause, R., Semadeni, M., & Cannella, A. (2014). CEO duality: A
review and research agenda. Journal of Management, 40(1),
256–286.
Kwansa, F. A., Song, Y., Sharma, A., & Gong, Y. (2014). Link
between executive stock ownership and corporate financial
performance. The Journal of Hospitality Financial
Management, 22(2), 111–122.
Lee, S., & Park, S. Y. (2009). Do socially responsible activities help
hotels and casinos achieve their financial goals? International
Journal of Hospitality Management, 28(1), 105–112.
Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J. W. (1992). A modest proposal for
improved corporate governance.The Business Lawyer, 59–77.
Luan, C. J., & Tang, M. J. (2007). Where is independent
director efficacy? Corporate Governance: An International
Review, 15(4), 636–643.
Mehran, H. (1995). Executive compensation structure, own-
ership, and firm performance. Journal of Financial
Economics, 38(2), 163–184.
Mizruchi, M. S. (1983). Who controls whom? An examina-
tion of the relation between management and boards of
directors in large American corporations. Academy of
Management Review, 8(3), 426–435.
Moon, J., & Sharma, A. (2014). The effect of board classifica-
tion in the restaurant industry. The Journal of Hospitality
Financial Management, 22(1), 32–40.
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988).
Management ownership and market valuation: An
empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20,
293–315.
Oak, S., & Iyengar, R. (2009). Investigating the differences in
corporate governance between hospitality and nonhospi-
tality firms. In J. Chen (Ed.), Advances in hospitality and
leisure (Vol. 5). Bingley, England: Emerald Group
Publishing Limited.
Oswald, S. L., & Jahera, J. S. (1991). The influence of owner-
ship on performance: An empirical study. Strategic
Management Journal, 12(4), 321–326.
Ozdemir, O., & Upneja, A. (2012). Board structure and CEO
compensation: Evidence from US lodging industry.
International Journal of Hospitality Management, 31(3),
856–863.
Park, K., & Jang, S. S. (2010). Insider ownership and firm
performance: An examination of restaurant firms.
International Journal of Hospitality Management, 29(3),
448–458.
Peng, M. W. (2004). Outside directors and firm performance
during institutional transitions. Strategic Management
Journal, 25(5), 453–471.
Pfeffer, J. S., & Salancik, G. (1978). The external control of
organizations: A resource dependence perspective. New
York, NY: Harper & Row.
Rechner, P. L., & Dalton, D. R. (1991). CEO duality and
organizational performance: A longitudinal analysis.
Strategic Management Journal, 12(2), 155–160.
Reich, A. Z. (1993). Applied economics of hospitality produc-
tion: Reducing costs and improving the quality of deci-
sions through economic analysis. International Journal of
Hospitality Management, 12(4), 337–352.
Tsai, H., & Gu, Z. (2007). Institutional ownership and firm
performance: empirical evidence from US-based publicly
traded restaurant firms. Journal of Hospitality & Tourism
Research, 31(1), 19–38.
Tse, E. C. Y., & Olsen, M. D. (1988). The impact of strategy
and structure on the organizational performance of restau-
rant firms. Journal of Hospitality & Tourism Research, 12
(2), 265–276.
Warfield, T. D., Wild, J. J., & Wild, K. L. (1995). Managerial
ownership, accounting choices, and informativeness of earn-
ings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20(1), 61–91.
Wright, P., Ferris, S. P., Sarin, A., & Awasthi, V. (1996).
Impact of corporate insider, blockholder, and institutional
equity ownership on firm risk taking. Academy of
Management Journal, 39(2), 441–458.
Yeh, C. (2013). Board governance and tourism firms’ perfor-
mance: The case of Taiwan. Journal of Quality Assurance
in Hospitality & Tourism, 14(2), 123–141.
Yeh, C., & Trejos, B. (2015). The influence of governance on
tourism firm performance. Current Issues in Tourism, 18
(4), 299–314.
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies
with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial
Economics, 40(2), 185–211.
16 J. IM AND Y. CHUNG
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 M
as
sa
ch
us
ett
s, 
Am
he
rst
] a
t 1
5:0
1 2
9 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
